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Core stability in chain-component additive games
Bas van Velzen a Herbert Hamers a Tamás Solymosi b
Abstract
Chain-component additive games are graph-restricted superadditive games, where an exoge-
nously given line-graph determines the cooperative possibilities of the players. These games
can model various multi-agent decision situations, such as strictly hierarchical organisations or
sequencing / scheduling related problems, where an order of the agents is fixed by some external
factor, and with respect to this order only consecutive coalitions can generate added value.
In this paper we characterise core stability of chain-component additive games in terms of
polynomial many linear inequalities and equalities that arise from the combinatorial structure
of the game. Furthermore we show that core stability is equivalent to essential extendibility.
We also obtain that largeness of the core as well as extendibility and exactness of the game are
equivalent properties which are all sufficient for core stability. Moreover, we also characterise
these properties in terms of linear inequalities.
Keywords: Core stability, graph-restricted games, large core, exact game.
JEL classification: C71
1 Introduction
Chain-component additive games were first introduced in [4]. At these superadditive games the
cooperative possibilities of the players are restricted by an exogenously given line-graph. In partic-
ular, only consecutive coalitions can generate added value. The class of chain-component additive
games contains the well-known classes of sequencing games (cf. [3; 6; 8]) and neighbour games (cf.
[7; 10]). Due to the combinatorial structure of chain-component additive games, and because it
covers many interesting classes of games, chain-component additive games are extensively studied
in game theory. Non-emptiness of the core is shown in [4]. Furthermore, it is proven in [14] that
the core coincides with the bargaining set and that the kernel only consists of the nucleolus. In
[17] a primal and in [11] a dual type algorithm is presented for the efficient computation of the
nucleolus.
The main focus of this paper is core stability. Core stability combines the well-known concept
”core” with the classical solution concept ”stable set” proposed in [20]. The core is stable if all
non-core members of the imputation set are dominated by a core element. In general, the existence
(cf. [13]) and uniqueness of stable sets is not guaranteed. However, if the core is stable, then
it is the unique stable set. A class of games that satisfies core stability is that of convex games
(cf. [15]). Apart from the result on convex games, only few results are known with respect to
core stability. These results include a characterisation of core stability for symmetric games (cf.
[2]) and a characterisation for assignment games in terms of the underlying matrix (cf. [18]). We
characterise core stability for chain-component additive games by introducing covering families.
aCentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands. E-mail: H.J.M.Hamers@uvt.nl and svelzen@uvt.nl
bDepartment of Operations Research, Corvinus University of Budapest, Pf. 489, 1828 Budapest, Hungary. E-mail:
tamas.solymosi@uni-corvinus.hu. Supported by grant OTKA T46194.
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These covering families give rise to (in the number of players) polynomially many linear equalities
and inequalities. We show the necessity of these linear equalities and inequalities using a dual
approach. First we appoint a certain subset of the imputation set and we show, using a variant of
Farkas’ Lemma, that this subset contains an undominated imputation outside the core if and only
if all vectors from a related polyhedron satisfy a well-chosen linear inequality. We then decompose
each member of this polyhedron into a sum of three types of basis vectors. Finally we use these
basis vectors to show that the well-chosen linear inequality is indeed satisfied for each member of
the polyhedron.
In this paper we also investigate largeness of the core, as well as extendibility and exactness
of the game. Largeness is the property that the lower boundary of the upper core coincides with
the core. A game is called extendible if each core element of each subgame can be extended to a
core element of the game. Finally, if a game is exact, then for every coalition there exists a core
element that allocates its value to its members. In [16] it is proven that largeness of the core is a
sufficient condition for core stability. In [9] extendibility of the game is shown to be necessary for
largeness and sufficient for core stability. Extendibility had been conjectured to be equivalent to
core stability, but in [19] a counter-example was given. We will show for chain-component additive
games that largeness, extendibility and exactness are equivalent. Moreover, we characterise these
concepts in terms of linear inequalities arising from the combinatorial structure of the game.
Finally, we refine the concept of extendibility in the following way. We call a game essential
extendibility if each core element of each subgame corresponding to an essential coalition can be
extended to a core element of the game. We show that essential extendibility is equivalent to core
stability for chain-component additive games.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall some concepts from
cooperative game theory and in Section 3 we state and prove our main results. In the Appendix
we state and prove some technical lemmas.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some concepts from cooperative game theory and we introduce chain-
component additive games.
A cooperative TU-game (N, v) consists of a finite player set N = {1, . . . , n} and a map v : 2N →
R that expresses the worth of each coalition. By convention, v(∅) = 0. A game (N, v) is called
superadditive if for each S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ). Coalition
S ⊆ N is called essential if for each partition P of S it holds that
∑
T∈P v(T ) < v(S). A coalition
that is not essential is said to be inessential. For each T ⊆ N , the subgame (T, vT ) is the game with




v(N), xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N} is the set of efficient payoff vectors respecting the worth each player
can obtain on its own. The upper core U(v) = {x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N} is the





i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N} is the set of efficient payoff vectors in the upper core. If a core
element is proposed as a payoff vector, then no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition.
Note that the core of a game can be empty. Games with a non-empty core are called balanced. If
for a balanced game each subgame is also balanced, then the game is said to be totally balanced.
An order on the player set is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N . Let σ be an order on the player set.
The marginal vector mσ(v) is defined by mσ
σ(j)(v) = v({σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ j}) − v({σ(i) : 1 ≤ i < j}).
A collection B ⊆ 2N\{∅} is called balanced if there exists a map λ : B → [0, 1] such that λ(S) > 0
for each S ∈ B and
∑
S∈B λ(S)e(S) = e(N), where ej(S) = 1 if j ∈ S and ej(S) = 0 otherwise.
Let x, y ∈ I(v). Now x is said to dominate y via coalition S ⊆ N if
∑
i∈S xi ≤ v(S) and xi > yi
for all i ∈ S. The core is called stable if for each imputation y outside the core there is a core
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element x and a coalition S ⊆ N such that x dominates y via S. A game (N, v) is said to be exact
if for each S ⊆ N there is an x ∈ C(v) with
∑
i∈S xi = v(S). The core is said to be large if for each
x ∈ U(v) there is a y ∈ C(v) with yi ≤ xi for each i ∈ N . Finally, a game is said to be extendible
if each core element of each subgame can be extended to a core element of (N, v). In other words,
the game is extendible if for each x ∈ C(vT ), T ⊆ N , there exists a y ∈ C(v) with yi = xi for each
i ∈ T .
In [16] it is shown that largeness of the core is a sufficient condition for core stability. It was
proven in [9] that extendibility is necessary for largeness of the core and sufficient for core stability.
For totally balanced games it is shown in [16] that exactness is implied by largeness. Moreover, in
[1] it is shown for totally balanced games that exactness is necessary for extendibility. In general,
exactness and core stability do not imply one another (cf. [1; 19]).
Finally we introduce chain-component additive games. Let σ0 : {1, . . . , n} → N be a bijective
map. Coalition S ⊆ N is said to be connected with respect to σ0 if for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n with
σ0(i), σ0(j) ∈ S it holds that σ0(k) ∈ S for all i ≤ k ≤ j. For coalition T ⊆ N , let T\σ0 denote the
partition of T into maximally connected components. A game (N, v) is a chain-component additive
game, with respect to σ0, if it is superadditive and if v(T ) =
∑
S∈T\σ0
v(S) for each T ⊆ N . That
is, the worth of a coalition is equal to the sum of the worths of its connected parts. Note that
disconnected coalitions are inessential. It is shown in [4] that chain-component additive games are
balanced. Obviously this implies that chain-component additive games are totally balanced as well,
since subgames inherit the chain-component additive structure.
In the remainder of this paper we assume without loss of generality that σ0(i) = i for each
i ∈ N . Let S be the set of connected coalitions with respect to σ0. It will be convenient to
write (with a little abuse of notation) a connected coalition S ∈ S as an (ordered) set of players
S = {s1, . . . , s2} with the convention that s1 = min S and s2 = max S. Note that for chain-
component additive games both the upper core and the core are completely determined by the
connected coalitions, i.e., U(v) = {x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ S} and C(v) = {x ∈ R
N :
∑
i∈N xi = v(N),
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ S}.
3 Core stability of chain-component additive games
In this section we state and prove our main results. First we show that for chain-component
additive games a large class of marginal vectors are core elements. Then we show that largeness,
extendibility and exactness are all equivalent. Furthermore we will characterise these concepts
in terms of inequalities. Subsequently we introduce a refinement of extendibility, called essential
extendibility, and show that is equivalent to core stability for chain-component additive games.
As a final result we will characterise core stability and essential extendibility in terms of (in the
number of players) polynomially many linear equalities and inequalities.
The following theorem shows that a large class of marginal vectors are core elements. In
particular, if an order σ : {1, . . . , n} → N is such that N\{σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} is connected with
respect to σ0 for all 1 ≤ l ≤ n, then the corresponding marginal vector m
σ(v) is a core element.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game. Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → N be such
that N\{σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} ∈ S for each 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Then mσ(v) ∈ C(v).
Proof: Let σ : {1, . . . , n} → N be such that N\{σ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} is connected with respect to σ0
for each 1 ≤ l ≤ n. Because of the definition of σ and the chain-component additivity of (N, v) it
holds that mσ
σ(n)(v) = v(N)− v({1, . . . , σ(n)− 1})− v({σ(n) + 1, . . . , n}), m
σ
i (v) = v({1, . . . , i})−
v({1, . . . , i−1}) for each i ∈ N\{σ(n)} with i < σ(n), and mσi (v) = v({i, . . . , n})−v({i+1, . . . , n})
for all i ∈ N\{σ(n)} with i > σ(n).
3




j (v) ≥ v(S). Let S ∈ S and write S = {s1, . . . , s2}. First assume that σ(n) 6∈ S. Then
either s2 < σ(n) or s1 > σ(n). Without loss of generality assume that s2 < σ(n). It holds that
∑
i∈S
mσi (v) = v({1, . . . , s2}) − v({1, . . . , s1 − 1}) ≥ v({s1, . . . , s2}) = v(S),
where the inequality follows from superadditivity. Now assume that σ(n) ∈ S. Observe that
∑
i∈S
mσi (v) = v(N) − v({1, . . . , s1 − 1}) − v({s2 + 1, . . . , n}) ≥ v({s1, . . . , s2}) = v(S),
where again the inequality follows because of superadditivity. 2
Note that from Theorem 3.1 it follows that mσ(v), mτ (v) ∈ C(v) with σ and τ such that σ(i) = i,
τ(i) = n + 1 − i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is also indirectly proven in [4].
In the upcoming part of this section we will characterise largeness, extendibility and exactness
in terms of inequalities. In order to do so we introduce covering families. We call an ordered set
{T1, . . . , Tm} ⊆ S an m-covering family of N if
(P1) for all i ∈ N there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ m with i ∈ Tj ;
(P2) Ti ∩ Ti+1 6= ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1;
(P3) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m there is an i ∈ N with i ∈ Tj \ (∪k 6=jTk).
Requirement (P1) states that every player is contained in least one element of a covering family,
and (P2) states that two subsequent elements of a covering family should not be disjoint. Notice
that (P3) is equivalent to stating that each proper subset of a covering family is not a covering
family itself. The following example illustrates the concept of covering families.
Example 3.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Then {{1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}, {4, 5}} forms a 3-covering family, since
it satisfies (P1),(P2) and (P3). Also note that {{1}, {1, 2, 3}, {3, 4, 5}} and {{1, 2}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5}}
do not form 3-covering families, since for both sets condition (P3) is violated. 3
Observe that an m-covering family could equivalently be described by the alternating sequence
of the 2m − 1 nonempty blocks of consecutive players who are covered by exactly one or exactly
two family-member coalitions. It follows that in an n-player chain-component additive game the





, provided, of course, that 2m − 1 ≤ n.









The following theorem characterises largeness, extendibility and exactness in terms of covering
family inequalities.
Theorem 3.2 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. For each covering family the corresponding inequality is satisfied;
2. The game has a large core;
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3. The game is extendible;
4. The game is exact.
Proof: We will show 1 ⇒ 2 and 4 ⇒ 1. The proof of 2 ⇒ 3 follows from [9] and 3 ⇒ 4 is shown
in [1], since chain-component additive games are totally balanced.
First we show that if for each covering family the corresponding inequality is satisfied, then
the core is large. Assume that (N, v) is such that the inequalities corresponding to the covering
families hold. Let x ∈ U(v). If x ∈ C(v), i.e. if
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), then we are done, so assume
that
∑
i∈N xi > v(N). We need to show the existence of a y ∈ C(v) with yi ≤ xi for each i ∈ N .
Instead, we will show the existence of an x1 ∈ U(v) with x1j < xj for some j ∈ N and x
1
i = xi for






j∈N xj . We will then argue that in a finite number of




j = v(N), i.e.
xp ∈ C(v).
Define S(x) = {S ∈ S :
∑
i∈S xi = v(S)} to be the set of connected coalitions which are tight
at x. We first show, by contradiction, that there is a j ∈ N such that j 6∈ T for all T ∈ S(x).
Suppose that for all j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T . According to Lemma A.2 S(x) contains
at least one covering family. Let {T1, . . . , Tm} be such a covering family. Since Ti ∈ S(x) for each
1 ≤ i ≤ m, it follows that
∑
j∈Ti



























The first inequality holds because {T1, . . . , Tm} is a covering family, and by our assumption, the
corresponding inequality is satisfied. The strict inequality holds because we have assumed that
∑






























xj , which contradicts (1). We conclude that it cannot hold that for every
j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T .
Now let j ∈ N be such that j 6∈ T for every T ∈ S(x). Define ε = min{
∑
i∈S xi − v(S) : j ∈
S, S ∈ S}. It clearly holds that ε > 0 since
∑
j∈S xj > v(S) for all S ∈ S with j ∈ S. Define x
1
by x1i = xi for all i ∈ N\{j} and x
1












i∈T xi−ε ≥ v(T ),
where the inequality holds since ε = min{
∑
i∈S xi − v(S) : j ∈ S, S ∈ S} ≤
∑
i∈T xi − v(T ). We






j∈N xj . Also note that S(x) ( S(x
1) since all









j > v(N), we can apply the same procedure








j . Recursively, we obtain
a sequence (xm)1≤m≤p with x










j∈N xj , for some p ≥ 1. Observe that, by definition of ε, S(x) ( S(x
1) ( . . . ( S(xp).
Since the set of players not covered by the families S(x) ( S(x1) ( . . . ( S(xp) is strictly shrinking,
it follows that we construct an xp ∈ C(v) with xp ≤ x in p ≤ n steps. Hence, the core of the game
is large.
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The second and final statement we need to show is that if the game is exact, then the inequalities
corresponding to covering families hold. Assume that the game is exact and let {T1, . . . , Tm} be






v(∪1≤i≤m−1(Ti ∩ Ti+1)) =
∑
1≤i≤m−1 v(Ti ∩ Ti+1), where the last equality holds because of (P3)
and because of the chain-component additive nature of (N, v). Since x ∈ C(v) it holds that
∑
j∈Ti




















We conclude that the inequality corresponding to covering family {T1, . . . , Tm} is satisfied. 2










≈ 2n−2 linear inequalities.
In the final part of this section we will investigate core stability of chain-component additive games.
Of course, if the condition of Theorem 3.2 is satisfied, then it easily follows that the core is stable.
However, this condition is too strong. We will obtain polynomially many linear equalities and in-
equalities arising from 2− and 3-covering families that characterise core stability. Furthermore we
prove that core stability for chain-component additive games is equivalent to essential extendibility.
A TU-game (N, v) is called essential extendible if for each essential T ⊆ N and each x ∈ C(vT )
there exists a y ∈ C(v) with yi = xi for each i ∈ T . Note that if a game is extendible, then it is
essential extendible. The following proposition shows that for each TU -game essential extendibility
is a sufficient condition for core stability.
Proposition 3.1 Let (N, v) be essential extendible. Then its core is stable.
Proof: For core stability we need to show that each imputation outside the core is dominated by
a core element. Let x ∈ I(v)\C(v). Let S ⊆ N be a smallest coalition that is not satisfied at
imputation x. In other words, S is such that
∑
i∈S xi < v(S) and for all T ⊆ S, T 6= S, it holds
that
∑
i∈T xi ≥ v(T ). Now observe that S is essential. Indeed, if S is not essential, then there is a
partition P of S with
∑
T∈P v(T ) ≥ v(S), implying that one of the coalitions in P is not satisfied
at x as well.




|S| for all i ∈ S. Clearly,
∑




i∈T xi ≥ v(T ) for each T ⊆ S, T 6= S, we conclude that z ∈ C(vS). Since S is essential, it follows
from the essential extendibility of (N, v) that there is a y ∈ C(v) with yi = zi for each i ∈ S. Now
observe that y dominates x via S. 2
We now approach the main theorem of this paper. In the proof of this theorem we apply a variant
of Farkas’ Lemma, proven in [5]. Note that we abuse notation by omitting all transpose signs.
Lemma 3.1 ([5]) Let A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm such that P = {x ∈ Rn : Ax ≤ b} 6= ∅. Let c ∈ Rn
and δ ∈ R. It holds for all x ∈ P that cx ≤ δ if and only if there exists a y ∈ Rm+ with yA = c and
yb ≤ δ.
We are now ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 3.3 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game. The following statements are
equivalent:
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1. Each 2-covering family inequality is satisfied. For each 3-covering family {T1, T2, T3}, if the
corresponding inequality is not satisfied, then T2 is inessential;
2. (N, v) is essential extendible;
3. The core of (N, v) is stable.
Proof: We first show 1 ⇒ 2. So assume that all 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied.
Furthermore assume for each 3-covering family {T1, T2, T3} with essential T2 that the corresponding
inequality is satisfied. We need to show that (N, v) is essential extendible, so let S ⊆ N be essential.
Now note that if {T1, S, T3} is a 3-covering family, then the corresponding inequality is satisfied by
assumption.
Let x ∈ C(vS). We will construct a y ∈ C(v) with yi = xi for each i ∈ S. First we make some
agreements on notation. Since S ∈ S and S 6= N it holds that N\S consists of at least one and at
most two components. For simplicity, let S1, . . . , Sm denote these components (so m = 1 or m = 2).
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m there is an si ∈ Si and a ti ∈ S such that {si, ti} is connected with respect to σ0.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let σi : {1, . . . , |Si|} → Si be an order on Si such that N\{σi(k) : 1 ≤ k ≤ l}
is connected with respect to σ0 for each 1 ≤ l ≤ |Si|. Note that this implies that σi(|Si|) = si
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. With each order σi on Si associate a partial marginal vector as follows. Let
mσi
σi(l)
(v) = v({σi(j) : 1 ≤ j ≤ l}) − v({σi(j) : 1 ≤ j < l}) for each l ∈ {1, . . . , |Si| − 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.









xl, if l ∈ S;




yk : T ⊆ S ∪ (
⋃
1≤q≤i
Sq), l ∈ T, T ∈ S}, if l = si, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.









yk ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ S with sm ∈ T . Furthermore, in case of m = 2 by definition
of ys1 we also have that ys1 +
∑
k∈T\{s1}
yk ≥ v(T ) for all T ∈ S with s2 6∈ T and s1 ∈ T . For




i∈T xi ≥ v(T ). Finally, let T ⊆ Si\{si}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
T ∈ S. It follows from Theorem 3.1 applied to the subgame (Si\{si}, vSi\{si}) and our choice of σi
that
∑
k∈T yk ≥ v(T ). We conclude that y ∈ U(v).
It remains to show that
∑
i∈N yi ≤ v(N), since by definition of ysm it holds that
∑
i∈N yi ≥
v(N). For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m let Ri = argmax{v(T ) −
∑
k∈T\{si}
yk : T ⊆ S ∪ (∪1≤q≤iSq)}. So
∑
j∈Ri
yj = v(Ri) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We assume that Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is maximal with respect to
inclusion. To be more precise, if R̄i = argmax{v(T )−
∑
k∈T\{si}
yk : T ⊆ S∪ (∪1≤q≤iSq)}, R̄i 6= Ri,
then Ri 6⊆ R̄i. Under this assumption the following three properties hold for Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m:
(Q1) If m = 2, then R1 ∩ R2 6= ∅ or R1 ∪ R2 6∈ S;
(Q2) Si ⊆ Ri for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
(Q3) ti ∈ Ri for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
We will only show (Q1), the other two properties are immediate from the assumed maximality of
Ri for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If m = 1 there is nothing to prove, so assume that m = 2. Suppose
R1 ∩ R2 = ∅ and R1 ∪ R2 ∈ S. By definition of R1 it holds that
∑
j∈R1




yj = v(R2) −
∑
j∈R2\{s2}
yj + v(R1) −
∑
j∈R1





The inequality comes from superadditivity. We have now obtained that R1 ∪R2 = argmax{v(T )−
∑
k∈T\{l} yk : T ⊆ S ∪1≤q≤2 Sq}, and this clearly contradicts our assumption that R2 is maximal
with respect to inclusion. We conclude that (Q1) holds.
We now distinguish between two possibilities.
Case 1: ∪mi=1Ri = N .
If m = 1, then we have that R1 = N . By definition of ysm it now follows that
∑
j∈N yj = v(N).

















≤ v(R1) + v(R2) − v(R1 ∩ R2) ≤ v(N).
The second equality holds by definition of R1 and R2. The first inequality is satisfied because
∑
j∈T yj ≥ v(T ) for each T ∈ S. The last inequality is satisfied because {R1, R2} is a 2-covering
family and we assumed that 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied.
Case 2: ∪mi=1Ri 6= N .
















≤ v(R1) + v(S) − v(R1 ∩ S) ≤ v(N).
The second equality holds by definition of y and R1. The first inequality because
∑
j∈T yj ≥ v(T )
for all T ∈ S. The second inequality is satisfied because R1 and S form a 2-covering family and we
assumed that 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied.
If m = 2, then it follows from R1 ∪ R2 6= N that R1 ∪ R2 /∈ S. Because of (Q3) we have that


























≤ v(R1) + v(S) + v(R2) − v(R1 ∩ S) − v(S ∩ R2) ≤ v(N).
Again, the second equality holds by definition of R1, R2 and y. The first inequality because
∑
j∈T yj ≥ v(T ) for each T ∈ S and the second because the inequality corresponding to the 3-
covering family {R1, S, R2} is satisfied. This concludes the proof of 1 ⇒ 2.
It remains to show 3 ⇒ 1, since 2 ⇒ 3 follows from Proposition 3.1. We first show that the
inequalities corresponding to 2-covering families are necessary. We then proceed with the necessity
of the condition involving 3-covering families.
Suppose that that the inequality corresponding to the 2-covering family {T1, T2} is not satisfied.
In other words, suppose that v(T1) + v(T2) > v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2). We will show that the core is not
stable by constructing a non-core imputation that cannot be dominated by any core element.
Let t∗ be such that T1 = {1, . . . , t
∗}, and consider the order σ : {1, . . . , n} → N with σ(i) =




mσi (v) = v(N) − v(T1) + v(T1 ∩ T2) < v(T2), where the inequality follows by





i (v) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{t
∗ + 1}. Therefore mσ(v) can only be
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dominated via coalitions that contain player t∗ + 1. However, at mσ(v) player t∗ + 1 receives a
payoff of mσt∗+1(v) = v(N)−v({1, . . . , t
∗})−v({t∗+2, . . . , n}) = v(N)−v(N\{t∗+1}). But for any
x ∈ C(v) it holds that xt∗+1 ≤ v(N) − v(N\{t
∗ + 1}). We therefore conclude that mσ(v) cannot
be dominated by a core element via a coalition containing player t∗ + 1. This implies that mσ(v)
cannot be dominated by any core element. So the core is not stable. Consequently, the inequalities
arising from 2-covering families are necessary for core stability.
We now show that the conditions for 3-covering families are necessary. Suppose that the inequal-
ities corresponding to 2-covering families are satisfied. Furthermore suppose that for the 3-covering
family {T1, T2, T3} the corresponding condition is not satisfied, i.e. suppose that v(T1) + v(T2) +
v(T3) > v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3) while T2 is essential. Again, we show that the core is not
stable by showing the existence of a non-core imputation that can not be dominated by any core
element. Before we actually start the proof, we first introduce some notation.
Define T ∗ = N\(T1 ∪ T3) and T = {T ∈ S : T
∗ 6⊆ T}. So T is the set of connected coalitions
not containing T ∗. Define P by
P = {x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈T






xi ≥ v(N) − v(T1) − v(T3)}.
Firstly we show that P 6= ∅ and that P ⊆ I(v). Secondly we show, by applying Lemma 3.1,
the existence of an x ∈ P\C(v) that cannot be dominated by any core element. This implies the
necessity of the condition involving 3-covering families.
Let T1 = {1, . . . , t1} and consider σ : {1, . . . , n} → N with σ(i) = i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t1}
and σ(i) = n + t1 + 1 − i for all i ∈ {t1 + 1, . . . , n}. From Theorem 3.1 it follows that m
σ(v) ∈








i (v) = v(N) − v(T1) − v(T3). We conclude that m
σ(v) ∈ P , and thus that P 6= ∅.
Next we show that P ⊆ I(v). Let x ∈ P . We need to show that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and
xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . Since T1, T3 ∈ T it holds that
∑
i∈T1






i∈T ∗ xi ≥ v(N) − v(T1) − v(T3) it follows that
∑
i∈N xi ≥ v(N). By definition of
P it holds that
∑
i∈N xi ≤ v(N). So we conclude that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). Because {i} ∈ T
for each i 6∈ T ∗ it holds that xi ≥ v({i}) for all i 6∈ T
∗. If |T ∗| > 1, then it also holds that
{i} ∈ T for all i ∈ T ∗. So in this case we have that xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . If |T
∗| = 1,
then T ∗ = {i} for some i ∈ N , and consequently we have that {i} 6∈ T . However, observe that
xi =
∑
j∈T ∗ xj ≥ v(N) − v(T1) − v(T3) ≥ v(T
∗) = v({i}), where the first inequality follows since
x ∈ P and the second by superadditivity. So if |T ∗| = 1, it also holds that xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
We conclude that P ⊆ I(v).
It remains to show the existence of an x ∈ P\C(v) that cannot be dominated by any core
element. In order to do so, define a matrix A and a vector b such that x ∈ P if and only if
Ax ≤ b. So for each T ∈ T ∪ {T ∗} there is a corresponding row −e(T ) in A and for coalition N
there is a row e(N) in A. Similarly, bi = −v(T ) if the i-th row in A is −e(T ) for some T ∈ T .
Furthermore, bi = −v(N) + v(T1) + v(T3) if the i-th row in A is −e(T
∗), and bi = v(N) if the
i-th row in A is e(N). Since P is nonempty it holds that Ax ≤ b has a solution. So we can




xi ≤ −v(T2) if and only if there is a y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T2) and yb ≤ −v(T2).
However, we will show that for all y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T2) it holds that yb > −v(T2). This
means there is an x ∈ P with −
∑
i∈T2
xi > −v(T2). Hence,
∑
i∈T2
xi < v(T2) and therefore
x 6∈ C(v). By definition of P , x can only be dominated by coalitions containing T ∗. But for every






yj ≥ v(T3) and
∑
j∈N yj = v(N). Consequently,
∑
j∈T ∗ yj ≤ v(N) − v(T1) − v(T3) for every y ∈ C(v). That is, at x coalition T
∗ receives a payoff
that is at least as much as its highest payoff at any core allocation. So x can not be dominated by
a core element via a coalition that contains T ∗. Consequently, the core is not stable. This implies
that for core stability the conditions corresponding to 3-covering families are necessary.
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It remains to show that for all y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T2) it holds that yb > −v(T2). For each
|T ∪ {T ∗, N}| -dimensional vector u ≥ 0 we write, with abuse of notation, uS instead of ui if the
i-th row of A is the row corresponding to coalition S. Define Y(u) = {S ∈ T ∪ {T ∗, N} : uS > 0}
as the set of coalitions that u assigns a positive weight to. Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T2).
Instead of calculating yb directly, we first decompose y by using Lemmas A.4, A.5 and A.6. These
lemmas are stated and proven in the Appendix. Then we derive the product of these decomposition
vectors with b. This enables us to obtain a bound for yb.
According to Lemma A.4 we can decompose y into
∑a1
k=1 λku
k + r1, with r1 ≥ 0, r1A =
−e(T2), Y(r
1)\{N} contains no partition of N and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a1 it holds that λk > 0




k + r2 with r2 ≥ 0, r2N = 0,
∑a2
k=1 µk ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a2 it holds that
µk > 0 and w
k satisfies (A2). This implies, because r1A = −e(T2) and w
kA = −e(T2) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ a2, that r
2A = (1 −
∑a2
k=1 µk)(−e(T2)). Note that, since 0 ≤ (1 −
∑a2
k=1 µk) ≤ 1, it






k=1 νk = 1 −
∑a2
k=1 µk and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a3 it holds that νk > 0 and z
k satisfies (A3).













k=1 νk = 1.
Before we show that yb > −v(T2) we first find bounds for u
kb, wkb and zkb. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ a1.




[−v(S)] + v(N) ≥ 0.
Here the inequality is satisfied because of superadditivity and because Y(uk)\{N} is a partition
of N . Now suppose that T ∗ ∈ Y(uk). Since Y(uk)\{N} is a partition of N it follows that











[−v(S)] + v(T1) + v(T3) ≥ 0.
The inequality holds because of superadditivity and because A is a partition of T1 and B a partition
of T3. Concluding, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a1 it holds that
ukb ≥ 0. (2)
Now let 1 ≤ k ≤ a2. First suppose that T
∗ 6∈ Y(wk). It holds that Y(wk) = Uk ∪ Vk ∪ {N}, where
Uk is a partition of T1 ∪ T2 and Vk a partition of T2 ∪ T3 with Uk ∩ Vk = ∅. Let V̄k consist of those
10

































[−v(S)] − v(T2 ∩ (∪T∈V̄kT ))
≥ −v(∪S∈Vk\V̄kS) − v(T2 ∩ (∪T∈V̄kT ))
> −v(T2).
We first explain the first inequality. According to Lemma A.9 there is a T ∈ V̄k with T ∩ T2 6= ∅.
This implies that {T1∪T2,∪T∈V̄kT} forms a 2-covering family. Observe that because of Lemma A.9
it holds that (T1 ∪ T2) ∩ (∪T∈V̄kT ) = T2 ∩ (∪T∈V̄kT ). Since we have assumed that the inequalities
corresponding to 2-covering families hold, the first inequality is satisfied. The second inequality
holds because of superadditivity and because Uk is a partition of T1 ∪ T2. The third and fourth
inequalities are satisfied due to superadditivity. Finally we explain the last inequality. According
to Lemma A.9 it holds that V̄k and Vk\V̄k are both nonempty, and that there is a T ∈ V̄k with
T ∩ T2 6= ∅. This means that {∪S∈Vk\V̄kS, T2 ∩ (∪T∈V̄kT )} forms a partition of T2. Because of our
assumption that T2 is essential the last inequality is satisfied.
Now suppose that T ∗ ∈ Y(wk). Since Uk ∩ Vk = ∅ it either holds that T
∗ ∈ Uk or T
∗ ∈ Vk.
Without loss of generality assume that T ∗ ∈ Uk. Now observe, since Uk is a partition of T1 ∪ T2,
that Uk\{T


















[−v(S)] + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3) − v(T2) + v(N)
≥ −v(T1) − v(T2 ∩ T3) − v(T2 ∪ T3) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3) − v(T2) + v(N)
≥ −v(T2).
The first inequality holds since we have assumed that the 3-covering family inequality corresponding
to {T1, T2, T3} is not satisfied. The second inequality because of superadditivity and because C is
a partition of T1, D is a partition of T2 ∩ T3 and Vk is a partition of T2 ∪ T3. The last inequality is
satisfied because {T1, T2 ∪T3} forms a 2-covering family with T1 ∩ (T2 ∪T3) = T1 ∩T2, and because
of our assumption that all 2-covering family inequalities are satisfied. Concluding, we have for all
1 ≤ k ≤ a2 that
wkb > −v(T2). (3)
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Finally let 1 ≤ k ≤ a3. According to Lemma A.6 it holds that Y(z
k) is a partition of T2. Now first





Here the inequality holds because Y(zk) is a partition of T2, our assumption that T2 is essential.
Now suppose that T ∗ ∈ Y(zk). Since Y(zk) is a partition of T2, it follows that Y(z
k)\{T ∗} can











[−v(S)] − v(N) + v(T1) + v(T3)
≥ −v(T1 ∩ T2) − v(T2 ∩ T3) − v(N) + v(T1) + v(T3)
> −v(T2).
The first inequality follows by superadditivity and the second by our assumption that v(T1) +
v(T2) + v(T3) > v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3).
Concluding, we have for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a3 that
zkb > −v(T2). (4)






































The first inequality holds because of (2). The second inequality holds because of (3) and (4). The




k=1 νk = 1. 2
The next example illustrates the decomposition lemmas that are used in the proof 3 ⇒ 1 of
Theorem 3.3. In particular we decompose a specific y ≥ 0 with yA = −e(T2) and show that
yb > −v(T2).
Example 3.2 Let N = {1, . . . , 7} and consider the 3-covering family {T1, T2, T3} with T1 = {1, 2},
T2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and T3 = {6, 7}. Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game for which all
2-covering family inequalities are satisfied, but for which v(T1) + v(T2) + v(T3) > v(N) +
v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3) with T2 essential.
It now holds that T ∗ = N\(T1 ∪ T3) = {3, 4, 5} and T = {S ∈ S : {3, 4, 5} 6⊆ S}. Define the










2 , if S = {1, 2, 3}, {2}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4}, {4, 5, 6}, {5, 6};
1, if S = {1, 2, 3, 4};
112 , if S = {5, 6, 7}, N ;
0, otherwise.
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Observe that yA =
∑
S∈T ∪{T ∗} yS(−e(S)) + yNe(N) = −e(T2). So we need to show that yb >
−v(T2). We will do this by decomposing y. Note that Y(y)\{N} contains a partition of N , for
instance U = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}}. Therefore we write y = u1 + r1, with
u1S =
{






2 , if S = {1, 2, 3}, {2}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4}, {4, 5, 6}, {5, 6}, {5, 6, 7}, N ;
0, otherwise.
Now Y(r1)\{N} does not contain a partition of N . However, it contains a subset that covers each
player of N\T2 exactly once, and each player of T2 exactly twice. For instance {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {2},
{3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}} is such a subset. Therefore we decompose r1 into 12w
1 + r2, with
w1S =
{






2 , if S = {2, 3, 4}, {5, 6};
0, otherwise.





1, if S = {2, 3, 4}, {5, 6};
0, otherwise.
So we have decomposed y into u1 + 12w
1 + 12z
1. We will now show that yb = (u1 + 12w
1 + 12z
1)b > 0.
First note that superadditivity of (N, v) implies
u1b = −v({1, 2, 3, 4}) − v({5, 6, 7}) + v(N) ≥ 0.
Furthermore it holds that
w1b = −v({1, 2, 3}) − v({4, 5, 6}) − v({2}) − v({3, 4}) − v({5, 6, 7}) + v(N)
≥ −v({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) − v({2, 3, 4}) − v({5, 6, 7}) + v(N)
≥ −v({2, 3, 4}) − v({5, 6})
> −v(T2).
Here the first inequality is satisfied due to superadditivity. The second holds because the 2-covering
family inequality corresponding to {{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {5, 6, 7}} is satisfied by assumption. The strict
inequality is satisfied by our assumption that T2 is essential. Finally observe that this assumption
also proves that
z1b = −v({2, 3, 4}) − v({5, 6}) > −v(T2).
We conclude that yb = (u1 + 12w
1 + 12z
1)b > 0 − 12v(T2) −
1
2v(T2) = −v(T2). 3
Observe that for an n-player chain component additive game our characterisation of core stability










3-covering inequalities, and for each 3-covering inequality that is not
satisfied there are at most n − 2 linear equations to consider.
The last theorem we present also deals with core stability and essential extendibility. The con-
dition involving 3-covering families of Theorem 3.3 is slightly strengthened. In particular, for
considering core stability and essential extendibility one may take into account a more restricted
set of equalities.
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Theorem 3.4 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game. The following statements are
equivalent:
1. For each 2-covering family the corresponding inequality is satisfied. For each 3-covering family
{T1, T2, T3}, if the corresponding inequality is not satisfied, then v(T2) = v(A)+v(B) for some
partition {A, B} of T2 with T1 ∩ T2 ( A, T2 ∩ T3 ( B, and A, B ∈ S;
2. (N, v) is essential extendible;
3. The core of (N, v) is stable.
Proof: From Theorem 3.3 it follows that 1 ⇒ 2 and Proposition 3.1 shows 2 ⇒ 3. Therefore we
only show 3 ⇒ 1.
Assume that the core is stable. From the proof of Theorem 3.3 it follows that each 2-covering
family inequality is satisfied. Assume that there is some 3-covering family {T1, T2, T3} with v(T1)+
v(T2)+ v(T3) > v(N)+ v(T1 ∩T2)+ v(T2 ∩T3) and v(A)+ v(B) < v(T2) for every partition {A, B}
of T2 with T1 ∩ T2 ( A, T2 ∩ T3 ( B and A, B ∈ S. We show that this leads to a contradiction.
Assume that {T1, T2, T3} is a smallest 3-covering family with v(T1) + v(T2) + v(T3) > v(N) +
v(T1 ∩T2) + v(T2 ∩T3) and v(A) + v(B) < v(T2) for every partition {A, B} of T2 with T1 ∩T2 ( A,
T2 ∩ T3 ( B and A, B ∈ S in the following sense: for each 3-covering family {S1, S2, S3} with
S2 ⊂ T2 either v(S1) + v(S2) + v(S3) ≤ v(N) + v(S1 ∩ S2) + v(S2 ∩ S3) or v(A) + v(B) = v(S2) for
some partition {A, B} of S2 with S1 ∩ S2 ( A, S2 ∩ S3 ( B and A, B ∈ S.
Since the core is stable, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that T2 is inessential. Hence, there is a
partition P = {P1, . . . , Pk}, k ≥ 2, of T2 with
∑
T∈P v(T ) ≥ v(T2). From superadditivity of (N, v)
we conclude that v(∪k−1i=1 Pi) + v(Pk) ≥
∑
T∈P v(T ) ≥ v(T2). Again using superadditivity we obtain
v(∪k−1i=1 Pi) + v(Pk) = v(T2). Since (N, v) is chain-component additive, we may assume that ∪
k−1
i=1 Pi
and Pk are connected. We conclude there are A, B ∈ S with v(A) + v(B) = v(T2) and {A, B} a
partition of T2. By assumption, either A ⊆ T1 ∩ T2 or B ⊆ T2 ∩ T3. Without loss of generality
assume that A ⊆ T1 ∩ T2.
First suppose that A = T1 ∩ T2. Then obviously B = T2\T1. Consequently
v(T1) + v(T2) + v(T3) = v(T1) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2\T1) + v(T3)
≤ v(T1 ∪ T2) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T3)
≤ v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3).
The first inequality holds because of superadditivity and the second because {T1 ∪ T2, T3} is a
2-covering family with (T1 ∪ T2)∩ T3 = T2 ∩ T3. Since v(T1) + v(T2) + v(T3) ≤ v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2) +
v(T2 ∩ T3) is a contradiction to our assumption, we conclude that A 6= T1 ∩ T2.
Now suppose that A ⊆ T1 ∩ T2, but A 6= T1 ∩ T2. Observe that
v(T1) + v(B) + v(T3) = v(T1) + v(A) + v(B) + v(T3) − v(A)
= v(T1) + v(T2) + v(T3) − v(A)
> v(N) + v(T1 ∩ T2) + v(T2 ∩ T3) − v(A)
≥ v(N) + v((T1 ∩ T2)\A) + v(T2 ∩ T3)
= v(N) + v(T1 ∩ B) + v(B ∩ T3).
The first inequality holds by assumption and the second one because of superadditivity. The last
equality comes from (T1 ∩ T2)\A = T1 ∩ B and T2 ∩ T3 = B ∩ T3. Obviously, {T1, B, T2} is a
3-covering family with B ⊂ T2 and v(T1) + v(B) + v(T3) > v(N) + v(T1 ∩ B) + v(B ∩ T3). By
assumption, there is some partition {C, D} of B with T1∩B ( C, B∩T3 ( D, and C, D ∈ S. From
v(A) + v(B) = v(T2) and v(C) + v(D) = v(B) it follows that v(A) + v(C) + v(D) = v(T2). From
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superadditivity we conclude that v(A ∪ C) + v(D) = v(T2). Note that B ∩ T3 ( D and therefore
T2 ∩ T3 ( D. Furthermore, since T1 ∩ B ( C, we have that T1 ∩ T2 ( (A ∪ C). This contradicts
our initial assumption. 2
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In this section we show some technical lemmas needed to prove Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3.
Lemma A.1 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game. Let x ∈ U(v). If A, B ∈ S(x) with
A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∪ B ∈ S, then A ∪ B ∈ S(x).
Proof: Since x ∈ U(v) it holds that
∑









xj = v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪ B),
where the inequality holds because of superadditivity. Since
∑
j∈A∪B xj = v(A ∪ B) it holds that
A ∪ B ∈ S(x). 2
Lemma A.2 Let (N, v) be a chain-component additive game and let x ∈ U(v). If for all j ∈ N
there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T , then S(x) contains a covering family.
Proof: Suppose that for all j ∈ N there is a T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T . We will construct a covering
family consisting of elements of S(x). Consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm: Finding a covering family within S(x).
Set T = ∅ and m = 1.
While ∪T∈T T 6= N .
Let am = min{j ∈ N : j 6∈ ∪T∈T T}. Let Tm be such that ∪T∈T T ∪ S ⊆ ∪T∈T T ∪ Tm for all
S ∈ S(x) with am ∈ S. Set T = T ∪ {Tm} and m = m + 1.
Let T = {T1, . . . , Tm} be the set produced by the algorithm. Since for all j ∈ N there is a
T ∈ S(x) with j ∈ T , it is obvious that, for each j ∈ N , the algorithm selects at least one subset
containing j. That is, for all j ∈ N , there is a Ti ∈ T with j ∈ Ti.
We now show that Ti∩Ti+1 6= ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1 by contradiction. Suppose that Ti∩Ti+1 = ∅
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m−1. By definition of Ti+1 it holds that Ti∪Ti+1 ∈ S. From Lemma A.1 we obtain
that Ti∪Ti+1 ∈ S(x). This contradicts the choice of Ti, since now ∪T∈T T∪Ti ( ∪T∈T T∪(Ti∪Ti+1).
Finally, we show that Ti ∪ Ti+2 6∈ S for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2 by contradiction. Suppose that for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2 it holds that Ti ∩ Ti+2 6= ∅. Then ai+1 ∈ Ti+2. But this contradicts the choice
of Ti+1 since now ∪T∈T T ∪ Ti+1 ( ∪T∈T T ∪ Ti+2. So Ti ∪ Ti+2 6∈ S.
We conclude that {T1, . . . , Tm} is a covering family. 2.
The following lemma is Proposition 3.1 of [12]. It states that each balanced collection that is
a subset of S necessarily contains a partition.
Lemma A.3 ([12]) Let B ⊆ S be a balanced collection. Then B contains a partition of N as a
subset.
We will now prove the decomposition lemmas needed for the proof of Theorem 3.3.
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with r1 ≥ 0, r1A = −e(T2), Y(r
1)\{N} does not contain a partition of N , and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a1
it holds that λk > 0 and u
k satisfies
(A1) ukS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ T ∪ {T
∗, N}, ukA = 0 and Y(uk) = Uk ∪ {N} for some partition Uk
of N .
Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T2). We show the decomposition by recursion. Suppose
that for some a∗ ≥ 0 we have written y =
∑a∗
k=1 λku
k + r1, with r1 ≥ 0, r1A = −e(T2) and for all
1 ≤ k ≤ a∗ it holds that λk > 0 and that u
k satisfies (A1). Note that this certainly holds for a∗ = 0
and r1 = y.
Now if Y(r1)\{N} does not contain a partition of N , then we are done, so suppose that
Y(r1)\{N} contains a partition, say U , of N . Define
• ua
∗+1
S = 1 if S ∈ U ∪ {N};
• ua
∗+1
S = 0 if S 6∈ U ;
• λa∗+1 = min{r
1
S : S ∈ U ∪ {N}}.
Note that λa∗+1 > 0 and that Y(u
a∗+1) = U ∪ {N}. Observe, since U is a partition of N , that
ua
∗+1A = 0. Thus, ua
∗+1 satisfies (A1). Furthermore, by definition of λa∗+1 and u
a∗+1 it holds
that r̄1 = r1 − λa∗+1u
a∗+1 ≥ 0. Finally, note, because ukA = 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a∗ + 1 and because
yA = −e(T2), that r̄




So it now holds that y =
∑a∗+1
k=1 λku
k + r̄1, with r̄1 ≥ 0, r̄1A = −e(T2), and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a
∗+1
it holds that λk > 0 and that u
k satisfies (A1).
Observe that because of our choice of λa∗+1 it holds that Y(r̄
1) ( Y(r1). This implies that in
a finite number of steps we can decompose y into
∑a1
k=1 λku
k + r1, with r1 ≥ 0, r1A = −e(T2),
Y(r1)\{N} does not contain a partition of N , and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a1 it holds that λk > 0 and that
uk satisfies (A1). 2
Lemma A.5 Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T2) and Y(y)\{N} does not contain a partition of
N . Then we can decompose y into
∑a2
k=1 µkw
k + r2, with r2 ≥ 0, r2N = 0,
∑a2
k=1 µk ≤ 1 and for all
1 ≤ k ≤ a2 it holds that µk > 0 and w
k satisfies
(A2) wkS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ T ∪ {T
∗, N}, wkA = −e(T2) and Y(w
k) = Uk ∪ Vk ∪ {N} for some
partition Uk of T1 ∪ T2 and some partition Vk of T2 ∪ T3 with Uk ∩ Vk = ∅.
Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that yA = −e(T2), and such that Y(y)\{N} does not contain a partition




k + r2, with r2 ≥ 0,
∑a∗
k=1 µk ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a
∗ it holds that µk > 0 and
that wk satisfies (A2). Note that this certainly holds for a∗ = 0 and r2 = y. If r2N = 0 then we are
done, so suppose that r2N > 0. Observe that since Y(y)\{N} does not contain a partition of N ,
and since Y(r2) ⊆ Y(y), it follows that Y(r2)\{N} does not contain a partition of N .
We will first show that
∑a∗
k=1 µk < 1 by contradiction. Suppose that
∑a∗
k=1 µk = 1. Then it
follows, using yA = −e(T2) and w
kA = −e(T2) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a






k=1 µk)(−e(T2)) = 0. Since r
2
N > 0, it follows that Y(r
2)\{N} is a balanced collection of N .
From Lemma A.3 we conclude that Y(r2)\{N} contains a partition of N . Since Y(r2) ⊆ Y(y), it
follows that Y(y)\{N} contains a partition of N . However, we assumed that this was not the case.
Therefore we conclude that
∑a∗
k=1 µk < 1.




k=1 µk < 1, r
N
2 > 0 and Y(r
2)\{N} does not contain
a partition of N , it follows that r2 satisfies the conditions of Lemma A.7. According to Lemma A.7





S = 1 if S ∈ Ua∗+1 ∪ Va∗+1 ∪ {N};
• wa
∗+1
S = 0 if S 6∈ Ua∗+1 ∪ Va∗+1 ∪ {N};
• µa∗+1 = min{r
2
S : S ∈ Ua∗+1 ∪ Va∗+1 ∪ {N}}
Note that µa∗+1 > 0. We will now show that w
a∗+1A = −e(T2). For each i ∈ T2 there are unique
S ∈ Ua∗+1 and T ∈ Va∗+1 with i ∈ S and i ∈ T . Note that since Ua∗+1 ∩ Va∗+1 = ∅, it holds that
S 6= T . Furthermore, for each i ∈ T1\T2 there is a unique S ∈ Ua∗+1 with i ∈ S and for each
i ∈ T3\T2 there is a unique T ∈ Va∗+1 with i ∈ T . We conclude that w
a∗+1A = −e(T2).
Since wa
∗+1A = −e(T2) we now observe that w
a∗+1 satisfies (A2). Also note that r̄2 = r2 −
µa∗+1w
a∗+1 ≥ 0. We will now show by contradiction that it holds that
∑a∗+1
k=1 µk ≤ 1. Suppose that
∑a∗+1
k=1 µk > 1. Because
∑a∗
k=1 µk ≤ 1, it follows that there is a 0 ≤ d < µa∗+1 with
∑a∗
k=1 µk+d = 1.




∗+1 + (r2 − dwa
∗+1). By definition of d it holds
that (r2 − dwa
∗+1)  (r2 − µa∗+1w
a∗+1) ≥ 0. Since yA = −e(T2), w
kA = −e(T2) for all 1 ≤
k ≤ a∗ + 1 and
∑a∗
k=1 µk + d = 1, it follows that (r
2 − dwa
∗+1)A = 0. Because d < µa∗+1,
it holds that Y(r2 − dwa
∗+1) 6= ∅. Therefore it follows that Y(r2 − dwa
∗+1)\{N} is a balanced
collection. By Lemma A.3 it now follows that Y(r2 − dwa
∗+1)\{N} contains a partition of N .
Since Y(r2 − dwa
∗+1) ⊆ Y(r2) it holds that Y(r2)\{N} contains a partition of N . This is clearly a
contradiction to our initial assumption, so we conclude that
∑a∗+1
k=1 µk ≤ 1.
It follows that y =
∑a∗+1
k=1 µkw
k + r̄2, with r̄2 ≥ 0,
∑a∗+1
k=1 µk ≤ 1 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a
∗ + 1 it
holds that µk > 0 and w
k satisfies (A2).
Observe that because of our choice of µa∗+1 it holds that Y(r̄
2) ( Y(r2). This implies that in a
finite number of steps we can decompose y into
∑a2
k=1 µkw
k +r2, with r2 ≥ 0, r2N = 0,
∑a2
k=1 µk ≤ 1
and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a2 it holds that µk > 0 and w
k satisfies (A2). 2
Lemma A.6 Let y ≥ 0 be such that yN = 0 and yA = d(−e(T2)), for some 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. Then we





k=1 νk = d, and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a3 it holds that νk > 0
and zk satisfies
(A3) zkS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ T ∪ {T
∗, N}, zkA = −e(T2) and Y(z
k) = Uk for some partition Uk of
T2.
Proof: Let y ≥ 0 be such that yN = 0, and yA = d(−e(T2)) for some 0 ≤ d ≤ 1. We recursively
show the decomposition. Suppose that for some a∗ ≥ 0 we have written y =
∑a∗
k=1 νkz
k + r3, with
∑a∗
k=1 νk ≤ d, r
3 ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a∗ it holds that νk > 0 and that z
k satisfies (A3). Note
that this certainly holds for a∗ = 0 and r3 = y.
Now if
∑a∗
k=1 νk = d, then it follows, because yA = d(−e(T2)) and z
kA = −e(T2) for all
1 ≤ k ≤ a∗, that r3A = yA −
∑a∗
k=1 νkz
kA = 0. Because r3N = 0, r
3 ≥ 0 and because A has




k and we are done. Therefore suppose that
∑a∗
k=1 νk < d.
Now r3A = yA −
∑a∗
k=1 νkz
kA = (d −
∑a∗
k=1 νk)(−e(T2)), with d −
∑a∗
k=1 νk > 0. Since r
3
N = 0,
and because in A the only row with positive entries is the row corresponding to N , this means that
r3S = 0 for all S ∈ T ∪{T
∗, N} with S 6⊆ T2. This implies that Y(r
3) is a balanced collection on T2.




S = 1 if S ∈ U ;
• za
∗+1
S = 0 if S 6∈ U ;
• νa∗+1 = min{r
3
S : S ∈ U}.
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Note that νa∗+1 > 0. Since z
a∗+1A = −e(T2), it follows that z
a∗+1 satisfies (A3). Also observe that
by definition of νa∗+1 and z
a∗+1 it holds that r̄3 ≥ 0. It remains to show that
∑a∗+1
k=1 νk ≤ d.
Suppose that
∑a∗+1
k=1 νk > d. Then it follows that r̄





k=1 νk < 0. Hence, r̄
3A = fe(T2) for some f > 0. However, this is impossible, since r̄
3 ≥ 0,
r̄3N = 0 and because A contains only non-positive entries in the rows not corresponding to N .
Therefore we obtain that
∑a∗+1
k=1 νk ≤ d.
Hence, we have that y =
∑a∗+1
k=1 νkz
k + r̄3, with
∑a∗+1
k=1 νk ≤ d, r̄
3 ≥ 0 and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a∗ +1
it holds that νk > 0 and that z
k satisfies (A3).
Observe that by definition of νa∗+1 and z
a∗+1 it holds that Y(r̄3) ( Y(r3). Hence, in a finite
number of steps we obtain that y =
∑a3
k=1 νkz
k, where νk > 0 and z
k satisfies (A3) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a3.
Since yA = d(−e(T2)) and that z
kA = −e(T2) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ a3 it follows that
∑a3
k=1 νk = d. 2
Lemma A.7 Let r2 ≥ 0 be such that r2A = f(−e(T2)) for some 0 < f ≤ 1, r
N
2 > 0 and Y(r
2)\{N}
does not contain a partition of N . Then Y(r2) contains a partition U of T1 ∪ T2 and a partition V
of T2 ∪ T3 with U ∩ V = ∅.
Proof: We will show how to obtain a partition of T1 ∪ T2. Analogously one can find a partition
of T2 ∪ T3. First we will show that we can find disjoint elements Sk ∈ Y(r
2), 1 ≤ k ≤ q, such that
(T1 ∪ T2) ⊆ ∪
q
k=1Sk. We will do this by giving a recursive argument.
Because r2A = f(−e(T2)) for some 0 < f ≤ 1 and 1 6∈ T2, it holds that
∑





By assumption r2N > 0 and we conclude that
∑
S∈T ∪{T ∗}:1∈S r
2
S > 0. Hence, there exists an
S1 ∈ Y(r
2), with 1 ∈ S1.
Now suppose that we have selected disjoint Sk ∈ Y(r
2), 1 ≤ k ≤ t, such that N\(∪tk=1Sk) =
{b, . . . , n} for some b ∈ N . Or in other words, suppose that ∪tk=1Sk is a head of σ0. Note that
t = 1 and S1 satisfy this property.
If b 6∈ T1 ∪ T2, then we are done, so suppose that b ∈ T1 ∪ T2. According to Lemma A.8,








S . Since for St it holds that
b − 1 ∈ St, b 6∈ St and r
2
St
> 0, it follows that there is an St+1 ∈ Y(r
2) with b − 1 6∈ St+1, b ∈ St+1
and r2St+1 > 0. We conclude that N \ ∪
t+1
k=1Sk = {c, . . . , n} with c > b. By recursion we obtain
disjoint Sk ∈ Y(r
2), 1 ≤ k ≤ q, with (T1 ∪ T2) ⊆ ∪
q
k=1Sk.
We will now show that (T1 ∪T2) = ∪
q
k=1Sk by contradiction. Suppose that (T1 ∪T2) ( ∪
q
k=1Sk.
Then N\(∪qk=1Sk) = {b, . . . , n} for some b ∈ T3\T2 with b − 1 ∈ T3\T2. According to Lemma A.8,








S . Since for Sq it holds that
b − 1 ∈ Sq, b 6∈ Sq and r
2
Sq
> 0, it follows that there is an Sq+1 ∈ Y(r
2)\{N} with b − 1 6∈ Sq+1,
b ∈ Sq and r
2
Sq+1
> 0. Note that N\ ∪q+1k=1 Sk = {c, . . . , n} with c > b. By recursion we therefore
obtain a partition of N . However, initially we assumed that Y(r2)\{N} does not contain a partition
of N . From this contradiction we conclude that (T1 ∪ T2) = ∪
q
k=1Sk.
Now let U = {S1, . . . , Sq} ⊆ Y(r
2) be a partition of T1 ∪ T2 and V = {R1, . . . , Rm} ⊆ Y(r
2)
a partition of T2 ∪ T3. If U ∩ V 6= ∅, then Si = Rj for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Hence,
{S1, . . . , Si, Rj+1, . . . , Rm} is a partition of N . This contradicts the assumption that Y(r
2) \ {N}
does not contain a partition of N . We conclude that U ∩ V = ∅. 2
Lemma A.8 Let r2 ≥ 0 be such that r2A = f(−e(T2)) for some 0 < f ≤ 1. Then it holds for all








S . Furthermore it holds









Proof: Let r2 ≥ 0 be such that r2A = f(−e(T2)) for some 0 < f ≤ 1. Let a ∈ T1 ∪ T2 with a > 1.
If a ∈ T1\T2, then it follows that a − 1 ∈ T1\T2. It follows from r










If a ∈ T2 and a − 1 ∈ T1\T2, then it follows from r
2A = f(−e(T2)) that
∑
S∈Y(r2)\{N}:a∈S








Finally, if a − 1 ∈ T2, then it follows from r
2A = f(−e(T2)) that
∑
S∈Y(r2)\{N}:a∈S




















Lemma A.9 Let r2 ≥ 0 be such that r2A = f(−e(T2)) for some 0 < f ≤ 1, r
2
N > 0 and
Y(r2)\{N} does not contain a partition of N . Consider a partition Vk ⊆ Y(r
2)\{N} of T2 ∪T3 and
let V̄k = {T ∈ Vk : T 6⊆ T2}. Then V̄k 6= ∅ and Vk\V̄k 6= ∅. Furthermore it holds that T ∩ T1 = ∅ for
all T ∈ V̄k and that there is a T ∈ V̄k with T ∩ T2 6= ∅.
Proof: Observe that from Lemma A.7 it follows that a partition Vk of T2 ∪ T3 exists. Note that
V̄k 6= ∅, since Vk is a partition of T2 ∪ T3 and T3 6= ∅.
We will now show that for all T ∈ V̄k it holds that T1 ∩ T = ∅ by contradiction. Suppose that
there is a T ∈ V̄k with T1 ∩ T 6= ∅. Since T ∈ V̄k it follows that T 6⊆ T2. That is, there is a j ∈ T
with j ∈ T3\T2. Since T is connected it follows that T
∗ ( T . This is a contradiction since the
coalitions containing T ∗ are not in T and therefore also not in Y(r2)\{N}. Hence it holds for all
T ∈ V̄k that T ∩ T1 = ∅. Because T1 ∩ T2 6= ∅, there is an S ∈ Vk with S ∩ T1 6= ∅. This implies
that S 6∈ V̄k and hence that Vk 6= V̄k. Finally, we prove that there is a T ∈ V̄k with T ∩ T2 6= ∅.
Suppose that for all T ∈ V̄k it holds that T ∩ T2 = ∅. According to Lemma A.7 there is a partition
Uk of T1 ∪ T2. This implies that Uk ∪ V̄k forms a partition of N , which is a contradiction to our
initial assumption. 2
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